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For the purposes of this paper the Arab Middle East is defined as Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Operationally, a number of the countries are effectively excluded from the subsequent regression analysis due to extensive missing data. This definition excludes some non-Arab states that are sometimes included in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, particularly Iran, Israel, and Turkey. These three, while not part of the Arab world, are included in the overall sample used in the statistical analyses reported in appendix table A.
"Regime change" is defined in the Polity IV dataset as a minimum three-point change in the polity score (in either direction), denoting "a substantive, normative change in political authority considered sufficient to present greater opportunities for regime opponents to challenge the noninstitutionalized authority of the polity" (Marshall and Jaggers 2004, 27) . It goes without saying that this definition of regime change" is considerably more modest than that used in popular parlance. See Przeworski et al. (2000, chapter 1) for discussion.
For the record, in addition to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, seven other countries scored -10 at some point between 1960 and 2000: Bahrain, Haiti, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, and Swaziland. Qatar and Saudi Arabia alone scored -10 for the entire sample period.
erroneously attribute the statistical influence of the omitted variables to the included variables, rendering the statistical inferences derived from them invalid. The only way to parse these competing explanations is to specify a general model and test the nested hypotheses.
In this paper a large number of hypotheses are nested within a series of cross-country statistical models. Methodologically these models are very good at discriminating among hypotheses relating to underlying structural prerequisites for democracy or factors associated with political liberalization. Caveat emptor: they are not very useful for examining hypotheses involving "democratization as a contingent choice of regime and opposition actors that can occur in a variety of socioeconomic and cultural conditions" (Posusney 2004, 128 ).
DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY
There is a large body of literature on the determinants of democracy and a number of relatively uncontroversial hypotheses-such as the importance of national identity and "modernization," as manifested in economic and/or educational attainment-as precursors for the establishment of stable, democratic polities going back to Lipset (1959) and Rustow (1970) . Subsequent arguments about democratic waves (Huntington 1984 (Huntington , 1993 or regional spillover "neighborhood" effects (Solingen 1998 ) have generally been substantiated empirically, and one could think of these as forming the core of a statistical model of democratic attainment across countries and over time. Beyond these relatively uncontroversial notions there are a much larger group of contested hypotheses. After this "core" model is estimated, "structural" hypotheses involving historical origins, external relations, and the structure of the economy are examined, followed by "internal" or cultural explanations. The hypotheses receiving statistical support are then synthesized and their quantitative relevance assessed.
Structural Hypotheses
Operationally a model of Polity IV scores was specified as a function of national identity proxied by ethnic fractionalization (its inverse); "modernization" represented by log real per capita income, log literacy, and log urbanization; the average world level of democracy; and the average level of democracy of bordering countries (the neighborhood variable). Each indicator is lagged by one year and reported in the first column of table 1. 5 The sample is 85 countries listed in appendix table A.1, accounting for roughly 80 percent of world population and 90 percent of world output for the period 1970-2000.
In the subsequent analysis it was found that the three modernization proxies were highly collinear. In response, a principal components aggregate (PCA, labeled "modernization") was formed, with nearly identical weights on the three components (GDP per capita 0.34; literacy 0.33; urbanization 0.33).
The regression is estimated using a random-effects estimator that controls for individual timeseries and cross-sectional error components in the panel (Hsiao 1986 ). As might be expected, the level of democracy in a particular country is strongly correlated with its ethnic homogeneity, its level of modernization, and the levels of democracy in the world and among its immediate neighbors.
A second common set of explanations about democratic performance involves the historical origins of a country's political institutions. Lipset et al. (1993) , for example, has argued that democracy is associated with British colonial rule, though the empirical support for this proposition is mixed (cf. Barro 1999 , Przeworski et al. 2000 , Fish 2002 ). 7 In regression 1.2, dummy variables for colonial rule are added to the specification. 8 The coefficient on the British colonial dummy is positive and significant, indicating that British colonial origins are indeed associated with democracy.
consumption, rents as a share of government revenue, grants as a share of government revenue, aid as a share of government revenue, a fuel exporter dummy, fuel exports as a share of GDP, an OPEC membership dummy, military expenditure as a share of GDP, and military personnel as a share of the labor force. An appendix with variable definitions and data sources is available from the author upon request.
A number of previous studies have used larger cross-sectional samples. Our sample is constrained by data availability in light of the large number of explanatory variables that will be used in the subsequent analysis. We do not regard this as particularly problematic-the omitted countries are typically either very small, very poor, or both, and the quality of data in some of these cases is highly questionable. Given the quality of the underlying data, we do not believe that maximizing sample size by using extrapolations and other ad hoc methods to fill in missing observations per Herb (2005) is warranted. Roughly 85 countries accounting for 80 percent of the world's population ought to be a large enough sample from which to draw statistical inferences. In one concession to this sample issue, literacy is used as a measure of human capital rather than alternative measures of educational attainment because the literacy data are more widely available than schooling data needed to calculate other indicators.
It has been frequently argued that the existence of large rents that can be captured by the state impedes democracy. In the Middle East, oil production is the dominant, though not exclusive, source of such rents.
0 Multiple channels for antidemocratic effects of rents have been identified. First, the existence of rents may absolve governments from taxation and, as a consequence, relieve pressure for accountability through what might be called the "accountability effect" (Ross 2001) . A straightforward indicator would be the tax share of government revenue. Second, rents may furnish governments with revenues for patronage and again relieve discontent or undercut the formation of social groups independent of the state. Government consumption as a share of national income could be a rough proxy for this. A third channel for rents to impede democracy would be by financially enabling the development and maintenance of institutions of internal repression. consumption as a share of GDP is added to the basic model, and its coefficient is positive and statistically insignificant. If the "patronage effect" hypothesis were correct, one would expect this coefficient to be negative. This result points to a more general concern with these regressions: While colonial origins are exogenous, and any causal relationship, if it exists, runs from colonial origins to current politics, the direction of causality is less clear with respect to government spending. It could be that democracies have large public sectors because the masses support government spending as a mechanism for redistributing income. This is less of an issue in regression 2.1 since it is the tax share of revenues, not the overall level of taxation or revenues, which is the explanatory variable.
The next three columns of table 2 report specifications using alternative measures of rent. In regression 2.3, following Birdsall and Subramanian (2004) , a dummy variable for countries in which fuel exports account for more than 0 percent of export revenues is added to the basic model and estimated with the expected negative coefficient. In regression 2.5, a broader measure of rents (defined as entrepreneurial and property income) as a share of government revenue are added to the core specification and estimated with the expected negative sign. In the final column, aid (another source 0 For general descriptions of the rentier state phenomenon, see Beblawi (1990) , Luciani (1990 Luciani ( , 1995 , Anderson (2001) , and Lust-Okar (2004).
As Anderson (2001, 56) observes, "the public sector accounts for over half the labor force: government employment is a form of social security" in the region. Ross (2001) argues that this approach mistakenly implies that the adverse effect of oil rents only takes effect beyond a certain threshold and that a continuous variable is preferred. In regression 2.4, fuel and mineral revenues as a share of total export revenues is added to the regression per Ross. The coefficient is statistically insignificant, and for the remainder of the paper the Birdsall-Subramanian formulation is used.
Some analysts (e.g., Herb 2005) argue that this is a disadvantage insofar as included state-owned enterprise income is not really rent and excluded oil taxes really are. If what one is concerned about, per Anderson (2001) , is the state's capacity to channel patronage, however, then the broader measure that includes state-owned enterprises is really to be preferred. of rent) was added to the specification and estimated with a positive coefficient. If the rents impede democracy, then one would expect this coefficient to be negative. However, it could be the case that the causality runs the other direction-a higher level of democracy induces more assistance, such as in the case of the Millennium Challenge Account (which admittedly did not exist during this sample period). Then the coefficient would be positive as obtained-and the aid variable would not be an exogenous regressor.
The third way rents affect democracy is through the "repression effect."
14 Ideally one would want data on internal security services, though in reality the distinction between the internal and external security services may be more theoretical than real. And the region is highly militarized: Bellin (2004, 143) , for example, writes, "The will and capacity of the state's coercive apparatus to suppress democratic initiative have extinguished the possibility of transition. Herein lies the region's true exceptionalism."
15 Cause (1995, 286) is typical: "Wars tend to concentrate power in the hands of the executive, a power most leaders are loath to give up. Wars make it easier to stigmatize as treasonous, and then suppress, opposition forces. War preparation leads to greater state control over the economy, limiting the power and autonomy of private sector economic actors who might press for democratic reform. War preparation requires building coercive apparatus that then can be used internally. . . ." Bellin writes, "Besides providing rhetorical legitimization for coercive regimes, persistent conflict has rationalized the prolonged states of emergency that stifle civil liberties in many MENA countries" (p. 157). With respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Anderson (2001, 56) observes: "It may be no coincidence that the prospects for democracy seem to increase in direct proportion to the distance of a country from the Arab-Israeli and Persian Gulf arenas." Cause (1995, 287) observes "the tentative opening of the Egyptian political system in the late 1970s occurred after Egypt had opted out of the Arab-Israeli conflict" (emphasis in the original).
CULTURAL EXPLANATIONS
The hypotheses examined thus far might be regarded as being "structural" in nature. Another class of explanations might be thought of as internal to society or cultural in nature. Huntington (1984) , for example, argued that the prevalence of certain values and beliefs made some societies more compatible with democracies than others, citing McClelland's (1961) attempt to measure the "need to achieve" based on an analysis of third-and fourth-grade school readers for a sample of countries in 1950. Perhaps a sample significantly limited by data availability. Huntington (1996) subsequently argued that the cultural origins of the democratic West lay in its globally distinct emphasis on individualism, invoking the work of Hofstede (1983 Hofstede ( , 2001 .
18 Indeed, one of Hofstede's variables is statistically correlated with democracy, though not the one that Huntington identified. As shown in regression 4.2, it is power-distance, the measure of comfort with hierarchy, which is negatively correlated with democracy, not the degree of cultural individualism as measured in Hofstede's scores. In regression 4.3, the need to achieve and power-distance culture measures are entered jointly and both retain their statistical significance, though strangely the world democracy average (representing the "democratic wave" effect) turns negative in this truncated sample.
More controversial as a determinant of democracy is the general role of religion and the specific role of Islam. Huntington (1984 Huntington ( , 1996 Barro (1999) and Fish (2002, 4) , who argues that his analysis provides "strong support for the hypothesis that Muslim countries are democratic underachievers."
18 According to Hofstede, statistical analysis of the responses to two rounds of survey questionnaires administered to 88,000 IBM employees over 1967-73 suggested that they could be characterized along four dimensions: a power-distance index ("the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is unequally distributed"); an uncertainty-avoidance index ("the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations"); an individualism-collectivism dimension ("individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose. . . collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups. . . ."); and a masculine-feminine dimension ("masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct . . . femininity stands for a society in which social gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life"). It is fair to say that this research is controversial. See McSweeney (2002) for a critique.
Ironically, in earlier an work Huntington identified comfort with hierarchy as an antidemocratic cultural attribute: "A political culture that highly values hierarchical relationships and extreme deference to authority presumably is less fertile ground for democracy than one that does not" (Huntington 1984, 209) .
The statistical evidence on this point is ambiguous, turning on the definition of the comparator group. In the first column of table 5, the population shares ascribing to major world religions are added to the core model. The coefficients on the Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, and Protestant Christian population shares are all positive and significant.
The coefficient on the Muslim share is insignificant .
However, these coefficients are all significantly greater or less than zero relative to the omitted group.
If the definition of the omitted group changes, then so will the estimated coefficients. In regression 5.2, only the Muslim population share is included and is estimated with a statistically significant negative coefficient-i.e. if Muslims are compared to all non-Muslims (regression 5.2), then they appear distinct. To push this further and explore whether the influence of Islam is being conflated with Arab culture, the ethnic Arab population share was added to the model (regression 5.5) and is estimated with a negative coefficient almost twice as large as the Muslim population share coefficient in regression 5.2.
In regression 5.6, the two variables are entered jointly, and the Muslim population share variable loses its statistical significance-it would appear that the category "Arab," not "Muslim," is driving these results.
Zogby's finding that the Arab ethnicity is the primary self-identification category in most Arab countries lends some plausibility to this conclusion.
24 Huntington (1996, 70) observes that among non-Western societies only Hindu civilization shared the West's distinct separation of religion and politics that "contributed immeasurably to the development of freedom in the West." He did not speculate as to whether the same cultural attribute might not have the same political impact in a non-Western society. Fish (2002) argues that what is important is not the Muslim share, but whether Muslims are a majority. In regression 5.3, the Muslim share is replaced with a Muslim majority dummy. The results are virtually identical, and the choice between the two makes no difference in the subsequent analysis, so the Muslim share specification is retained.
The regressions were also estimated with an Arab majority dummy replacing the Arab ethnic share variable. This distinction had no appreciable impact on the results.
Many Muslims and many Arabs live in oil-exporting countries, and it is important to model the potential relationships among these variables carefully; otherwise one runs the risk of misattributing the influence of one variable to the other. 25 In the final three columns of Fish uses four indicators to measure the status of women: the difference in male and female literacy rates, the sex ratio (the number of males per 100 females), the percentage of high-ranking positions in executive branch agencies occupied by women, and finally a composite gender empowerment index constructed by the UN Development Program. Unfortunately, time-series data permitting the construction of a reasonable panel are only available for the first two measures. Another possible indicator of the status of women would be the female share of the labor force. One could imagine that this would signal the economic status of women and, by extension, their ability to place demands on the political system.
In regressions 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 (table 6) , the literacy gap, sex ratio, and female labor participation variables are added to a specification of the core model augmented by the Muslim share, Arab share, and fuel exporter variables. The literacy gap is estimated with a positive and statistically significant coefficient. However, this estimate is fragile, and is strongly influenced by the inclusion of four South
Asian countries-India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka-all of which combine high literacy gaps with at least some periods of high democratic polity scores during the sample period. 
ASSESSMENT
These six tables suggest a rich and complex set of possible determinants of democracy. Table 7 reports a set of regressions derived from the preceding analysis. Modernization, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the average neighborhood polity score, the average world polity score, the Arab ethnicity population share, British colonial history, and the share of taxes in state revenues are robust correlates with democracy. Conditional on these variables, the Muslim population share, the oil exporter dummy, the military personnel population share, the general conflict dummy, and the Israel conflict dummy are not correlated with democracy. The sex ratio is marginally significant in regression 7.7. 28 These regressions explain more than half of the total sample variation (R [overall]) and roughly two-thirds of crosssectional variation (R [between]) when the temporal variation in the data is suppressed.
In table 8, the coefficients from regression 7.7 are used to calculate the impact on the democracy scores of a one standard deviation change in each of the explanatory variables. The biggest single impact is of British colonial history-a positive value of this dummy variable is worth more than three points, which in the Polity IV definition would amount to a regime change if a change of this magnitude occurred in three years or less.
The next three largest effects come from modernization, regional spillover effects, and the Arab ethnic share. The neighborhood effect is much more important than the impact of worldwide democracy waves-the influence of a one standard deviation change in the regional average has four times the impact of a similar magnitude change in the worldwide average. The effect of modernization and ethnic fragmentation is larger than the effect of rents as represented by the tax revenue share variable. Table reports The power distance variable is also marginally significant in a smaller, data-constrained sample.
In other contexts, some have argued that the British colonial effect is derived from the inclusion of small Caribbean island democracies. This argument is not applicable in the current setting-those small island democracies are not in the sample. 0 In the case of Morocco, its apparent democratic underachievement is driven by the neighborhood effect-because of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, Morocco technically borders Spain, which is used in the calculation of Morocco's neighborhood effect. If these Spanish enclaves were excised, as some Moroccans might wish, then the value of Morocco's neighborhood variable, and consequently its fitted democracy score, would fall, in fact bringing Morocco almost precisely to the regression line. Jordan is a relative democratic overachiever. It has a smaller non-Arab minority than the other countries in table 9, and as a consequence predicted negative impact of Arab ethnicity is relatively large, which pulls down the predicted democracy score.
See Carothers (2002) for a thoughtful critique of the assumptions underlying the democratic transition literature. For expositional convenience, "liberalizing" and "democratizing" will be used interchangeably in this paper, keeping in mind Carothers's admonition that the two are not identical.
In Tunisia, president-for-life Habib Bourguiba was declared medically unfit and, following the relevant provisions of the in Algeria and Jordan in 1989. 34 Per Carothers, the relatively tentative (and possibly reversible) process of liberalization in the Arab countries may be more typical of the worldwide experience in political development over the past generation than the more well-known and decisive breakthroughs cited previously.
One way of thinking about the apparent stability of the region's authoritarian political regimes is
to ask, what is the probability of a liberalizing transition at any given point of time? In this formulation, the unit of analysis is the national polity, the subject of analysis is a binary variable of whether or not this polity experienced political change in this period, and the subject of investigation are the forces that would give rise to political change. In statistical terms such an approach is known as a proportional hazard (PH) or duration model; operationally one would construct a panel dataset defined by a set of i countries for t years. This approach facilitates modeling a rich set of regime dynamics: for example, allowing the probability of the hazard (political change) occurring at a particular time to depend on the number or recentness of prior hazards. 35 The estimated coefficients represent the impact of a covariate on the "hazard of failure."
The next task is to identify the set of variables to be used as explanators of liberalizing regime changes. There is a large body of work on theories of political change and its determinants. Some of these theories are more amenable to modeling than others (in particular, theories that focus on country or regime characteristics as opposed to those that emphasize a country's relation to the world system), and even among explanations centering on internal characteristics, there are issues of data availability, at least at the cross-national level. 37 constitution, replaced by the then recently appointed prime minister general, Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, who initiated widespread political and economic reforms, including legalizing previously banned political parties, releasing roughly 100 Islamist political prisoners, and pardoning more than 8,000 detainees. However, in the words of one observer, "By the early 1990s, Ben Ali was practicing the full Bourguiba, cult and all" (Henry 2004, 12) . The Constitution was revised to excise the office of president-forlife, but this did not prevent Ben Ali from being reelected for the third time in 1999 with 100 percent of the vote and in 2002 pushing through a constitutional amendment permitting an unlimited number of consecutive terms in office. In October 2004 he was reelected with 94 percent of the vote.
The constitutional changes in Algeria, which involved a reduction in the dominance of the National Liberation Front and the introduction of multiparty elections, were subsequently reversed. Another move toward more representative government began in 1995, following a period marked by extraconstitutional government and widespread political violence. In recent years there has been continued political liberalization, though the armed forces maintain a dominant role in politics. 34 In Jordan, the period 1989-92 witnessed the lifting of martial law restrictions on political activity, the integration of previously excluded groups into the political process, and the first national elections in 22 years, in the context of monarchical rule. 35 For informative introductions to these (and related) models, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997), Bennett (1999) , van den Berg (2000) , and Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001) . See Gasiorowski (1995) for an application to political regime stability.
In this application all of the models have been estimated in the form of Weibull functions, which impose monotonicity on the relationship between the regime variable and the right-hand-side covariates. Weibull models permit monotonic duration dependence of a positive (i.e., the hazard rate increases over time), negative (the hazard rate decreases over time), or constant (the hazard rate is time invariant) form. In the regressions in table 10, the coefficient on the Weibull function is estimated to be significantly greater than one, which indicates that the impact of the covariate on the hazard increases over time.
As a starting point, the variables employed in the previous section to predict the level of democracy were used to model its advent. Appended to this list were other variables such as prior history of liberalizing transitions, population density, the growth rate of urbanization, country size, international trade openness, dependency on trade taxes, and inflation, which in previous studies had been found to be statistically associated with the likelihood of political regime change.
In table 10, six of these models are reported. The estimated coefficients have been transformed into the form of an accelerated failure time model, so that the coefficients represent the impact on the expected waiting time for a liberalizing breakthrough. The results indicate that the cumulative number of a country's prior liberalizing transitions, the world level of democracy, and the growth rate of GDP per capita are robustly correlated with the likelihood of a democratic transition; literacy is also positively correlated, though less robustly. The first two variables could be thought of as environmental or trend variables: The more a country has liberalized in the past, the less likely it is to experience further liberalization as it encounters a kind of democratic asymptote, while the greater the worldwide level of the democracy, the greater encouragement of, and shorter waiting time for a liberalizing breakthrough in any particular country.
The other three variables relate more directly to country performance or characteristics.
Conditional on the other variables, the more rapid the growth of per capita income growth, the longer the waiting time for transition-i.e., in the short-run economic performance buys a certain degree of popular acquiescence, though in the long-run rising incomes auger against authoritarian rule.
38 Surprisingly, the degree of international trade openness is also associated with longer waiting times for liberalizing breakthroughs, though some might point to the history of East Asia, where countries democratized at relatively high levels of per capita income after adopting an outward-oriented development model. Conversely, conditional on the other variables, the higher the rate of literacy, the shorter the waiting time for a democratic transition. It would be erroneous to conclude from these results that as a policy matter one should oppose economic growth or support closure to trade as a means of encouraging democratization. Both are desirable in and of themselves, and, in the long run, prosperity contributes to expectations of political liberalization. However, in the short run, these forces may act as a kind of safety valve for discontent. Status as a fuel exporter also contributes to longer waiting times, but this result is not robust to the inclusion of any of the other additional regressors reported in table 10, though these additional regressions are not reported for the sake of brevity.
widely available, and data on wealth distribution or subjective appraisals of relative deprivation even less so, and what research does exist on this fragmentary data does not yield robust conclusions. See Perotti (1996) and Przeworski et al. (2000) and sources cited therein.
As an illustration, the expected likelihood of a liberalizing transition for eight large Arab countries derived from regression 10.1 is plotted in figure 3 . Several things can be observed. First, the likelihood of a liberalizing transition in these countries was quite low at the beginning of the sample period and generally increased about 5 percent in any given year for the group as a whole. However, this increase has not been monotonic. For several countries there was a noticeable spike in the probability of a liberalizing breakthrough in 1989 or 1990, which was during a worldwide democracy wave, a period in which Algeria and Jordan experienced liberalizing regime changes according to the Polity IV scoring.
The spike for Morocco came later, primarily a product of world conditions together with poor economic performance in Morocco during the early 1990s. In both cases the likelihood of a breakthrough in a particular year peaked at more than 20 percent, a substantial likelihood, though well under a 50 percent probability. Morocco, which did not experience transition, adhered to the prediction of the model, whereas in some sense Jordan beat the odds.
In regression 10.2, in which the share of trade taxes in government revenue is added to the core specification, the imposition of trade taxes is associated with a shorter waiting time until a democratic transition. In some previous research, trade taxes have been shown to be associated with political instability-imposing trade taxes and delinking from the world economy encourages lawlessness in forms such as smuggling and underinvoicing, and contributes to the de-legitimization of the political regime.
(Though it could be argued that causality runs in the other direction: Weak regimes rely on trade taxes For a number of the Arab countries the time-series data is fragmentary, and while these countries were included in the underlying regression sample, the time-series graphs for these countries are not particularly illuminating.
But the Arab population share changes only slowly-in this application it amounts essentially to a fixed effect that reduces the probability of liberalization but does not have much of an impact on changes in its likelihood from year to year. (The same could be said for the religious affiliation variables.) This point is illustrated in figure 4 for Egypt, the largest Arab country. Figure 4 plots the likelihood of a democratizing regime change derived from each of the six models reported in table 10. The plot associated with regressions 10.5 and 10.6 lie below the others while exhibiting the same pattern of yearto-year variation. In this sense the difference of the two interpretations of the Arab population share variable is potentially important. If it is the case that Arabs are unusually quiescent, then the plots of regressions 10.5 and 10.6 may provide a credible indication of the level and evolution of the likelihood of a liberalizing breakthrough. However, if the Arab population share is really a proxy for some unobservable, especially one that may exhibit more temporal variation than the Arab ethnic population share, then these plots may be a misleading indicator of the changes in the hazard rates.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has used a series of statistical models to examine the determinants of democracy and liberalizing regime changes with a focus on the countries of the Middle East and North Africa region.
The models suggest that the Arab world's ongoing democratic deficit is comprehensible in terms of underlying structural factors: The most important determinants of democracy are a British colonial history, lack of modernization, the democratic status of neighboring countries, taxes as a share of government revenue, ethnic homogeneity, and the Arab ethnic population share. In a considerably truncated sample, some cultural attributes are also significant, and the male-female sex ratio was often statistically significant, though other proxies for the status of women were not.
The region is self-evidently underendowed with respect to the first three attributes and arguably the fourth, but it is the interpretation of the Arab ethnic population share that is problematic. It could point to some essential antidemocratic aspect of Arab culture, though the small existing body of survey evidence does not appear to bear this out, or it could be that in the statistical analysis the Arab population share is simply a proxy for some unobservable, such as investment in institutions of internal repression that may not be culturally determined but rather reflects the preferences of the governing elite. It could also be the case that while the statistical result is correct-holding the other regressors constant, the Arab ethnic share is negatively correlated with democracy-this is simply capturing a particular historical moment in the Middle East and that in the long run, "Arab-ness" will lose its explanatory power.
It is also worth noting hypotheses that did not receive robust support in this analysis, namely that the region's lack of democracy is related to the presence of oil rents, conflict with Israel or other neighbors, or Islam. The last result, that the Muslim population share is not a robust explanator of democratic status, parallels the finding of Noland (2005) that Islamic religious affiliation is unrelated to economic performance.
With respect to the likelihood of liberalizing political transitions, the models indicate that the odds on these occurring in any given year are generally low but rising, as relatively poor economic performance combined with increasing levels of education erode popular acquiescence to authoritarian governance. In this respect, the distinction between the interpretation of the Arab ethnic share as an intrinsic cultural marker and as a proxy for some unobservable factor is important-if the former is correct, then one would expect the likelihood of regime change to rise only gradually over time, whereas if it is the latter, the probabilities may exhibit much greater temporal variability. Yet another possibility is that these results are driven by the relatively common occurrence of governments based at least partly on narrow subethnic or tribal allegiances, which could generate complex transitional paths.
The results reported in this paper suggest that regimes throughout the region are likely to come under increasing pressure over time as increasing education and prosperity generate populations increasingly dissatisfied with authoritarian rule, though there is an implicit tension between the long and short run: Higher levels of development are associated with democracy, but in the short run, growth may limit pressures for political change. It is also the case that developments both within the region and elsewhere-in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, for example-may contribute to demonstration effects or waves. That said, specific democratizing episodes in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine during 2005-collectively labeled "the Arab Spring"-each have strongly idiosyncratic elements. Nevertheless, the advent of pan-Arab media such as the television stations al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, may be contributing to a more genuinely pan-Arab cultural space in which developments in one country have a more immediate and profound influence on outcomes elsewhere within the region. E astern E urope Latin America E as t As ia S outh/C entral As ia S ub-S aharan Africa Arab Middle E as t S o rce: P olity IV P roject, Marshall and J aggers (2003) . u 25 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Note: F itted values generated from regres s ion 7.7. P rediction for S audi Arabia and Qatarnot available (n.a.) due to mis s ing data on tax revenue. 
